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How often does an ERCOT price move cost someone half a million dollars?

Counting the months in 2026 where the ERCOT monthly energy price moved far enough from its baseline to swing a buyer's bill by more than $500,000 — and showing why the answer is a table, not a number.

Period Jan–Jul 2026 (settled) Market ERCOT-wide average energy price Source ERCOT IMM monthly reports Prepared 20 Aug 2026
The short answer

It depends entirely on how much energy you deliver — and 2026 has been one big month plus six quiet ones.

$500,000 is not a price move. It becomes one only when you divide it by a volume. For a book averaging 100 MW (~74,000 MWh a month), a $500K swing needs a move of just $6.72/MWh — and five of the seven settled months in 2026 cleared that on day-ahead prices. For a 10 MW customer the same $500K needs $67.20/MWh, and no month in 2026 came close.

Across the plausible mid-market range — 50 to 250 MW average load — the count lands at 3 to 6 material months out of 7, i.e. roughly 0.4 to 0.9 per month. But that average is doing dishonest work: strip January out and the typical monthly deviation collapses from $16.85/MWh to $4.57/MWh.

And $500,000 is not an industry number — nobody publishes one. Section 05 tests the same seven months against thresholds that are citable, including the SEC's codified 10% rule, which needs no volume assumption at all and therefore gives every customer the same answer: 6 of 7 months on day-ahead, 5 of 7 on real-time — but only one of them an overrun.

Settled months 7 Jan–Jul 2026. August is not yet published.
At 100 MW · day-ahead 5 / 7 0.71 material months per month vs the 6-month average.
At 100 MW · real-time 3 / 7 0.43 per month. Real-time was the calmer series this year.
Break-even load ~68 MW Average load at which the median 2026 month crosses $500K on DA.
01 — The data

ERCOT monthly prices, 2026 year to date

These are ERCOT-wide average energy prices — the load-weighted average settlement point price for the month — published by Potomac Economics in its role as ERCOT's Independent Market Monitor. Day-ahead and real-time are shown separately because in 2026 they told very different stories.

ERCOT-wide average energy price, 2026 — with deviation from the January–June six-month average
MonthHoursGas $/MMBtu DA $/MWhΔ vs 6-mo avgΔ vs Jan RT $/MWhΔ vs 6-mo avgΔ vs Jan

January 2026 is the whole story. Winter Storm Fern (23–26 January) drove Texas spot gas to a record $30.57/MMBtu on 26 January. Day-ahead cleared at $95.47/MWh for the month — 2.4× the six-month average — while real-time settled at $57.45/MWh, because actual demand came in below forecast and the grid held. That $38.02/MWh gap between what day-ahead buyers paid and what the market actually cleared is the single largest number in the dataset, and it is a basis event, not a level event.

02 — Shape of the year

One tail observation and six quiet months

Deviation of each month's price from the January–June 2026 six-month average. The vertical scale is not kind to the other six months — that squashing is the finding.

Day-ahead Real-time Zero line = the six-month average price
Deviation in $/MWh. January day-ahead sits +$55.98 above the six-month average; every other day-ahead month is between −$2.34 and −$19.10. A table of the same values is in section 01.
03 — Turning $500K into $/MWh

Your own book size

The whole question reduces to one line of arithmetic. A move of Δ dollars per MWh, applied to V MWh of delivered energy, moves the bill by Δ × V. So the move that costs exactly $500,000 is Δ = 500,000 ÷ V. Put your own load in and the page recounts.

04 — The count

Material months by book size

Definition — "material month"
| ( Pm − B ) × Vm | > $500,000
Pm
ERCOT-wide average energy price in month m ($/MWh)
B
the baseline price — either the Jan–Jun average or the January start-of-period price
Vm
energy actually delivered in month m (MWh)

In plain terms: the price sat far enough from the baseline that, once multiplied by the energy actually taken, the bill landed more than half a million dollars away from what the baseline implied. It is a bill test, not a price test — materiality belongs to the customer, not to the market. "Material month" is a term coined for this study; it is not industry vocabulary, and the $500,000 threshold is not an industry number. Section 05 tests the same data against thresholds that are.

Each row is a book size. Each strip shows the seven settled months of 2026 in order — a filled square means that month's price move swung the bill by more than $500,000 against that baseline.

crossed ±$500K did not J F M A M J J  left to right
Baseline A — the six-month average price ($39.50/MWh day-ahead, $33.98/MWh real-time). The fair comparison: what a fixed-price strike set at the period average would have produced.
Avg loadMWh / monthBreak-even move Day-aheadnReal-timen
Baseline B — the price at the start of the period (January 2026: $95.47/MWh day-ahead, $57.45/MWh real-time). Six comparable months; January cannot deviate from itself.
Avg loadMWh / monthBreak-even move Day-aheadnReal-timen

Baseline B is a trap, and worth knowing why. Anchoring on January means anchoring on a storm month. Every subsequent month then looks like a $60–75/MWh miss, and almost any book above 25 MW registers a "material move" every single month. That is arithmetically true and commercially meaningless. If you use a start-of-period reference in a customer-facing model, expect it to produce numbers that flatter the product and won't survive a sophisticated buyer's scrutiny.

The direction problem

The test above uses absolute value, so a month that came in $500K cheaper than baseline counts exactly the same as one that came in $500K more expensive. Split them out and the picture changes a great deal — 2026 has been a cheap year in ERCOT, and every month except January sat below the six-month average.

Overruns versus windfalls — the same months, split by direction, against the six-month average
Avg load DA either wayDA overrunDA saving RT either wayRT overrunRT saving

This decides how the number can be used. If the proposition is "we protect you from cost shocks", the honest 2026 count at 100 MW is 1 in 7, not 5 in 7 — and against the January baseline it is zero, because no month was more expensive than January. If the proposition is "we prove what you actually paid versus what you should have", two-sided is correct: a buyer who locked at $39.50 and then watched the market trade at $24 was demonstrably worse off, and that is a real claim.

05 — Industry thresholds

What everyone else calls a significant move

There is no published industry standard that says "a move of $X/MWh is significant." No regulator, rating agency or major consultancy defines one, and the numeric triggers in real C&I supply contracts are bilateral and confidential. But four anchors do exist, and they are citable.

Four defensible anchors — ranked by how hard the number is
AnchorThe numberStatusApplied to ERCOT 2026
SEC Reg S-K Item 305
Instruction 3.A
≥ 10% of end-of-period price Codified rule text. The only hard bright line found. $3.95/MWh day-ahead
$3.40/MWh real-time
REP unit margin
index products
$3–8/MWh adder Broker-quoted market practice. Directional. A move past this erases the whole margin on an index book
REP unit margin
fixed-price retail
$26–50/MWh SEC-filed. Via Renewables, blended ~20 states. Only January cleared it — and it cleared by $56
SEC SAB 99
SAB Topic 1.M
5% of pre-tax income A screen the SEC explicitly refuses to treat as dispositive. Company-specific; needs the customer's P&L
The one that fixes this study
| Pm − B | > 0.10 × B

The SEC's sensitivity-analysis floor is a percentage of price, not a dollar total, so it needs no volume assumption at all. That removes the flaw that made the $500K question unanswerable as a single number: every customer gets the same count. It is also the number a CFO's auditors already recognise.

The same seven months, recounted — volume-independent, against the Jan–Jun average
MonthDA move% of baseline≥10%?RT move% of baseline≥10%?

Under the SEC test, 6 of 7 months qualify as significant on day-ahead and 5 of 7 on real-time — but only one (January) is an overrun. April is the only other month that finished above baseline, and only on real-time.

What the market itself calls extreme

ERCOT and the PUCT do define hard price numbers — they just define extreme, not significant. Worth knowing because they bound the distribution:

ERCOT / PUCT-defined price limits, current as of August 2026
MechanismValueSinceMeaning
High System-Wide Offer Cap$5,000/MWh1 Jan 2022Cut from $9,000 after Winter Storm Uri
Low System-Wide Offer Cap$2,000/MWh2021Flat figure; the old "50× gas index" formula was deleted
Peaker Net Margin trigger$315,000/MW-yr2012 basis3 × CONE of $105,000. Crossing it switches the cap to LCAP for the rest of the year
Unsecured credit$01 Oct 2023NPRR1112 eliminated it entirely — every dollar of exposure is now collateralised
Collateral call trigger100% of TPE
(advisory at 90%)
currentPost by close of the 2nd business day

One market-structure change worth flagging. ERCOT's real-time market was redesigned on 5 December 2025 — RTC+B, co-optimising energy and ancillary services, the largest change since 2010. The ORDC price adder is being replaced by per-product Ancillary Service Demand Curves, and the single system-wide offer cap has split into separate day-ahead and real-time caps. Any historical ERCOT price analysis that spans that date is comparing two different markets. This study sits entirely after it, which is fortunate — but the 2025 comparison in section 06 does not.

The recommendation

Retire the $500,000 figure. Use two thresholds instead, and say which one you are using every time you quote a count:

For the defensible, audit-facing claim — the SEC 10% test. It is codified, it needs no volume assumption, and a CFO's finance team already reports market risk this way.

For the commercial claim — a multiple of the customer's own unit margin. This is what a retailer actually means by "significant": a move that eats the margin on the book. For an index product that is $3–8/MWh; for a fixed-price retail book, $26–50/MWh. It reframes the pitch from "prices are volatile" to "this move was N times your margin on that volume", which is a sentence a counterparty can act on.

The evidence that the second framing bites: every ERCOT retailer that failed in 2021 had a unit margin in the tens of dollars per MWh and met a move of $8,000–9,000/MWh sustained for 77 consecutive hours — hundreds of times the entire margin on the book, realised in days. Griddy went to Chapter 11; Just Energy filed a $418.4M one-time hit; Entrust received a single ERCOT invoice near $300M and was rendered insolvent; Brazos was billed $2.1bn. Even NRG, hedged and vertically integrated, took a $967M first-quarter loss.

06 — What the number does and doesn't support

Five things to know before this goes in a deck

07 — Method

How the count was built

  1. Take the settled monthly price series

    ERCOT-wide average energy price for each month of 2026, day-ahead and real-time, read from the Independent Market Monitor's monthly reports. Seven months are settled and published (January–July); August is not yet available.

  2. Set the two baselines

    Baseline A is the arithmetic mean of January–June 2026 — one fixed strike for the whole period. Baseline B is the January 2026 price, held flat. Both were requested; both are reported.

  3. Compute the deviation

    Δm = Pm − baseline, in $/MWh, for each month m.

  4. Convert to delivered energy

    Vm = average load (MW) × actual hours in month m × load factor. Hours used: Jan 744, Feb 672, Mar 743 (DST), Apr 720, May 744, Jun 720, Jul 744.

  5. Flag the material months

    A month counts when |Δm × Vm| > $500,000. The count is reported as hits out of comparable months, and as a per-month rate.

08 — Data confidence

Where this is solid and where to harden it

Solid: the source is ERCOT's own Independent Market Monitor, the series definition is unambiguous, and the same figures were read from three separate report vintages (the January, June and July 2026 monthly reports) with agreement to the cent on every month except January real-time, which rendered as $57.43 / $57.45 / $57.48 across vintages. $57.45 is used here; the ±$0.05 spread changes no conclusion.

To harden before external use: these values were read off charts in published PDFs rather than pulled from raw settlement data. Before any of this goes to an investor or a design partner, re-derive the series from ERCOT's own Historical DAM and RTM Settlement Point Price files, which give hourly prices by hub and load zone. That also unlocks the two things this analysis cannot do at monthly ERCOT-wide granularity: zone-specific prices (Houston, North, West and South diverge materially) and hourly exposure, which is where the real distribution lives.

09 — References

Sources

  1. Potomac Economics — ERCOT Wholesale Electricity Market Monthly Report, July 2026. Primary price series (Jan–Jul 2026).potomaceconomics.com · ERCOT Independent Market Monitor
  2. Potomac Economics — Monthly Report, June 2026. Corroborating read.potomaceconomics.com
  3. Potomac Economics — Monthly Report, April 2026. Third corroborating read; confirms series name is "ERCOT-wide Average Energy Prices DA vs RT".potomaceconomics.com
  4. Potomac Economics — Monthly Report, January 2026. Source of the 2025 comparison series.potomaceconomics.com
  5. Potomac Economics — 2025 State of the Market Report for ERCOT. Annual context.potomaceconomics.com
  6. ERCOT — ERCOT Monthly, January 2026. Winter Storm Fern operational account (23–26 January; ~13.5 GW of wind iced; grid stable, actual demand below forecast).ercot.com
  7. Integrity Energy — Q1 2026 Energy Market Recap. Record daily gas price of $30.565/MMBtu on 26 January 2026.integrityenergy.com
  8. Modo Energy — ERCOT January 2026: Winter Storm Fern comes to Texas. Independent account of the January scarcity event.modoenergy.com
  9. ess-news — Winter Storm Fern: BESS faces first major scarcity test in ERCOT's redesigned market.ess-news.com
  10. ERCOT — Market Reports and Real-Time Market. Raw DAM/RTM Settlement Point Price files, for hardening the series.ercot.com
  11. U.S. EIA — Electricity Monthly Update: Regional Wholesale Markets. Cross-check on regional price ranges.eia.gov

Materiality thresholds (section 05)

  1. SEC — 17 CFR § 229.305, Regulation S-K Item 305, Instruction 3.A to paragraph (a)(1)(ii): registrants "should use changes that are not less than 10 percent of end of period market rates or prices" absent economic justification.ecfr.gov · the only hard bright line found
  2. SEC — Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, Materiality (SAB Topic 1.M). Source of the 5%-of-pre-tax-income rule of thumb, and of the SEC's explicit statement that "exclusive reliance on this or any percentage or numerical threshold has no basis in the accounting literature or the law."sec.gov
  3. Via Renewables (formerly Spark Energy) — Q2 2023 results, SEC EX-99.1. Retail electricity gross margin of $50.31/MWh for the quarter, $47.59/MWh for H1 2023. FY2022 was $34.00/MWh (FY2022 release); FY2023 $43.59/MWh. Blended across ~20 states, not ERCOT-only.sec.gov · the only filed $/MWh retail margin found
  4. Deloitte — Roadmap: Hedge Accounting, §2.5 Hedge Effectiveness. The 80–125% dollar-offset band is practitioner convention interpreting ASC 815's undefined "highly effective", not codified text. IFRS 9.6.4.1(c) dropped the numeric band entirely.dart.deloitte.com
  5. PCAOB — AS 2105, Consideration of Materiality in Planning and Performing an Audit. Prescribes no percentage; the 5–10% of pre-tax income and ½–1% of revenue/assets figures are textbook convention only.pcaobus.org
  6. ERCOT — Market Notice M-A120721-01. High System-Wide Offer Cap lowered from $9,000/MWh to $5,000/MWh effective 1 January 2022.ercot.com
  7. 16 Tex. Admin. Code § 25.509 — Scarcity Pricing Mechanism. Low cap of $2,000/MWh (the former "50× gas index" formula was removed by the PUCT in 2021); Peaker Net Margin threshold of 3 × CONE.law.cornell.edu
  8. Brattle — ERCOT CONE for 2026. Confirms the CONE input to the PNM threshold "has not been updated since 2012 from the $105,000/MW-year value" — hence the $315,000/MW-yr trigger. Brattle recommends $293,000/MW-yr; adoption not confirmed.brattle.com
  9. ERCOT — Market Notice M-A080123-01 (NPRR1112). All unsecured credit limits eliminated effective 1 October 2023.ercot.com
  10. ERCOT — 2025 Credit Management. Total Potential Exposure mechanics; advisory notice at 90% and collateral call at 100% of posted financial security, due by close of the 2nd business day.ercot.com
  11. ERCOT — RTC+B go-live, 5 December 2025. Real-time co-optimisation; ORDC replaced by per-product Ancillary Service Demand Curves; system-wide offer cap split into DASWCAP and RTSWCAP.ercot.com · any series spanning this date compares two different markets
  12. U.S. EIA — Today in Energy: ERCOT prices during Winter Storm Uri. Prices at or near the $9,000/MWh cap for roughly 77 consecutive hours, against a 2020 average of $22/MWh.eia.gov
  13. Just Energy Group — MD&A, FY ended 31 March 2021 (SEC EX-99.2). $418.4M one-time negative impact from Winter Storm Uri.sec.gov
  14. U.S. Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit — In re Entrust Energy, No. 22-20603. A single ERCOT invoice of roughly $300M rendered Entrust insolvent.ca5.uscourts.gov
  15. Texas Attorney General — Griddy Energy settlement. ~$29M in storm bills forgiven for 24,000 customers; Griddy filed Chapter 11.texasattorneygeneral.gov

Two things this section could not find, stated plainly. First, no regulator, rating agency or major consultancy publishes a named benchmark for what wholesale price move is "significant" to a retailer or a C&I buyer — the anchors above are borrowed from adjacent disciplines, not lifted from an energy standard. Second, no public C&I supply agreement discloses a numeric material-adverse-change or repricing trigger; those are bilateral and confidential. Industry blogs quote swing/bandwidth tolerances of 10%, 20% and 25% with equal confidence and no primary source, so "±10% is standard" should not be repeated as fact. Neither gap is a research failure — both are genuine absences, and both are arguably an opportunity.